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construction and engineering companies seeking damages for injuries
to McCormick's real property allegedly caused by negligent operation
of the Town's stormwater drainage systems. McCormick alleged that
the Town operated its drainage systems in a manner such that stormwater previously diverted elsewhere flowed across Walmart's property
and onto McCormick's property causing injury. The Circuit Court of
Greenbrier County granted a motion to dismiss the Town as a defendant on the grounds that McCormick's complaint failed to state a
claim against the Town for which the circuit court could grant relief.
McCormick appealed.
The Supreme Court of West Virginia first addressed the Town's
contention that because the stormwater from Town facilities first
flowed over Walmart's property before entering McCormick's property, the Town could not be liable. Citing Whorton v. Malone, the court
noted that a landowner could not claim immunity because of the subsequent path of stormwater through a third party's land before injury
occurred on the land of another.
The court next dismissed the Town's argument that because the
Town granted Walmart a permit to construct a store on Walmart's
property, West Virginia law granted the Town statutory immunity from
the suit. Section 29-12A-5(a) immunizes political subdivisions for
claims that arise due to the action of private parties who first obtain a
permit. However, the court noted McCormick was not attempting to
hold the Town liable for Walmart's actions. Specifically, McCormick
had alleged that the Town itself had been negligent in operating the
Town's own drainage systems, and therefore McCormick's claim was
The court thus found that McCornot precluded by § 29-12A-5(a).
mick had stated a claim against the Town for which the circuit court
could grant relief and accordingly reversed the circuit court. Chief Justice Maynard, in dissent, found no basis in case law for holding a nonadjacent landowner liable for water runoff injuries to another. The
dissent stated that case law only required that a landowner be reasonable in light of effects on adjacent landowners when diverting stormwater. Additionally, the dissent stated that because the court had never
recognized a duty of a landowner to alleviate stormwater problems
caused by the development of nearby land, the court should have affirmed the circuit court.
Matthew Sarles
WYOMING
In re The Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn
River Sys., 85 P.3d 981 (Wyo. 2003) (holding: (1) the district court
lacked jurisdiction to hear claim to the extent irrigators sought to enforce federal rights, (2) irrigators failed to preserve the right to bring
claim by not challenging reservoir certificate, (3) irrigators were not
entitled to reopen water rights certification confirmation process, (4)
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resjudicata barred the claims, (5) laches barred the claims, and (6) the
irrigators' due process rights were not violated).
John Max and Roberta Lee Stutzman ("the Stutzmans"), owners
and individual irrigators of Wyoming farmland, brought an action in
the Wyoming Supreme Court appealing the district court's dismissal of
their petition to intervene in the Big Horn River general adjudication
("Adjudication") claiming rights to water stored in the Buffalo Bill
Reservoir ("Reservoir").
The Stutzmans' farmland in Park County, Wyoming is located
within the Shoshone Reclamation Project ("Project"). The Project,
initiated in 1899, was a federal reclamation project constructed and
operated by the Bureau of Reclamation ("BOR") pursuant to the Reclamation Act of 1902. As early settlers acquired Project land, they were
required to complete a water rights application, allowing them and
their heirs to use stored water in the Reservoir. The Reservoir was the
centerpiece of the Project and provided water for irrigation, power
generation, municipal supply, recreation, and other beneficial uses.
The Reservoir also provided water to four irrigation districts that supplied water to individual users like the Stutzmans through contracts.
In January 2001 the Stutzmans filed a petition to intervene in the
Adjudication because they were dissatisfied with the BOR's administration of the Reservoir's stored water. Alleging their predecessors acquired Project lands through water applications and patents, the
Stutzmans, as heirs, claimed implied secondary water rights from Reservoir permits and ownership of a proportionate share of water in the
Reservoir by virtue of federal land patents, water rights applications,
repayment contracts, and the Reclamation Act of 1902. They did not
allege denial of any specific amount of water to which they were entitled under these contracts, but rather raised the broader question of
who owned or controlled the water stored in the Project.
Both the United States and the State of Wyoming filed separate
motions to dismiss the petition. The district court granted these dismissals based on a lack of lacked jurisdiction over the claims after consideration of the federal patents, the Reclamation Act, and the doctrines of laches and res judicata. The Stutzmans' appeal arose out of
the continued Adjudication, first initiated in 1977. Primarily, the Adjudication determined what water rights the federal government reserved for the Wind River Indian Reservation's benefit, but the Adjudication consisted of three phases. The Stutzmans' case fell under Phase
III litigation, which addressed adjudication of all state water rights evidenced by a permit or certificate.
On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court first addressed the issue
of jurisdiction. The court concluded that at least four entities held
rights to Project water, including the federal government, the state, the
district, and the end user. The Stutzmans' alleged rights to a share of
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the stored water involved both the state and the federal government.
While the district court retained jurisdiction over their state property
rights, the court could not enforce their rights against the United
States pursuant to federal patents and contracts. Therefore, the court
held the district court properly found it lacked jurisdiction over the
Stutzmans' claims to the extent that they sought to enforce federal
contracts and ruled that the district court could determine the state
claims.
Examining these state claims, the court next addressed the question of whether the Stutzmans failed to preserve their right to bring a
claim by not challenging the Reservoir certificates. The Stutzmans
sought a declaratory judgment in the district court for their implied
secondary water rights after failing to obtain a secondary reservoir
permit from the BOR, their irrigation district, and the State Engineer.
The district court held the Stutzmans' failure to challenge the reservoir
certificates within the time limit set out in Phase III litigation procedures barred their claims by laches and res judicata. The court concluded the district court correctly found the Stutzmans' claims were
untimely and barred by looking at the nature and scope of their water
rights claims.
The Stutzmans based their claim for an implied secondary water
right upon Condict v. Ryan and Wyoming common law. They argued
the right had not yet been adjudicated, because only the right to store
water under the permits had been adjudicated in 1963 and then confirmed in 1985. They contended their implied secondary right gave
them, not the BOR, the power to control their share of stored water
based on: (1) reservoir permit conditions stating the intent of stored
water was for irrigation of lands, including theirs, (2) patents issued to
the land with the right to use the water for the Project, (3) the specific
share of water allotted via the water rights applications required of
their predecessors, and (4) the repayment contract between the
United States and the Shoshone Irrigation District. The court looked
again at the principles established in Condict to determine the nature
of the Stutzmans' claim and held the Stutzmans failed to preserve their
right to bring a claim by not challenging the reservoir certificates.
Also on appeal, the court addressed whether the Stutzmans had the
ability to challenge the issuance of their water rights certificate to the
BOR. Both the State of Wyoming and the United States contended the
reservoir permits were fully adjudicated in 1963 and the applicable
statutes barred the Stutzmans from filing late claims. The court determined the legislature designed the water rights statutes intending
fully adjudicated certificates to be final and complete statements of the
holder's rights. In addition, Phase III procedures allowed the Stutzmans to challenge the confirmation of their previously adjudicated
permit by 1985. They could have also filed an application for a secondary permit by the deadline. The Stutzmans argued neither action was
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necessary because their rights already vested and they were not required to challenge or seek additional permits. The district court held
it was unwilling to set aside years of progress in the general adjudication to consider the Stutzmans' petition and, instead, needed to conform to its scheduling order and move forward. Thus, the court also
held the Stutzmans were not entitled to reopen the water rights certification confirmation process by failure to challenge their certificate at
the appropriate time.
To address the district court's ruling that res judicata barred the
Stutzmans' claims, the court looked at four factors: identity in parties,
identity in subject matter, similar issues relating to the subject matter,
and whether the capacities of the persons were identical in reference
to both the subject matter and the issues between them. The court
held that while the subject matter and issues involved in the Stutzmans'
claims were different from those actually litigated in the adjudication
of the reservoir permits, such issues could have been raised, and all
other elements of res judicata were present. Since res judicata applies
to issues that should have been litigated, the court found the Stutzmans had ample time to raise their claims and since they did not, res
judicata rightfully barred their claims.
The district court also held the doctrine of laches barred the
Stutzmans' claims. The court noted a claim of laches is comprised of
two elements, inexcusable delay and injury and prejudice to an opposing party or others. The court determined the Stutzmans' delay to
make claims in 1963 or 1985 was clearly inexcusable. The court found
the nature of water rights and the limited nature of the resource itself
presumed prejudice to others competing for water on the Big Horn
River system and, thus, laches applied. The Stutzmans argued their
case involved legal title and therefore making a laches analysis inapplicable. However, the court stated that under Wyoming law, water users
do not own the water. Water users, like the Stutzmans, are only
granted rights to its use; therefore, this case did not involve title.
Therefore, the court held laches properly barred the Stutzmans'
claims.
Finally, the court addressed the issue of whether the district court
violated the Stutzmans' right to due process when it dismissed their
petition to intervene. The district court's dismissal did not bar the
Stutzmans from all rights to use the stored water. The court held no
right existed for them to have their claim to a state water right decided
in the general adjudication. Their irrigation flow rights confirmed by
the Irrigation District had not changed nor had their ability to make
claims in federal court. In addition, the due process clauses of the
United States and Wyoming Constitutions protect citizens against deprivation of property without due process of law. The Stutzmans had
the burden to show the court affected their property interest in an impermissible way. However, the Stutzmans did not satisfy the burden of
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proof, based on their benefit from both the proper procedures for notice and opportunity to object. Therefore, the court held the district
court did not violate the Stutzmans' due process rights.
In conclusion, the Wyoming Supreme Court held the district court
properly exercised its long established procedures to bring finality and
certainty to an extended, expensive, and complicated judicial effort,
and affirmed the decision of the district court. However, the Stutzmans were not limited in pursuing their contract rights against the
BOR.
JuliaHerron

